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Foreign
aid and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
The Palestinian-Israeli
conflict is influenced a great deal by foreign aid contributions for
the simple reason that the two parties are heavily dependent on these
contributions in all respects. Israel, which is relatively less
dependent on foreign aid, receives direct and indirect economic
support from the United States and European Union, in addition, of
course, to material support in the form of military assistance.
One can speak of two reasons Israel receives this monetary backing:
first is the commitment that Europe has made to the survival of Israel
as a form of compensation/support after the suffering of the Jewish
people in Europe during World War II, but second and more important is
the political self-interest that drives both American and European
support. Israel plays a political and strategic role in the region
that the United States and European countries believe advances their
interests. Thus, most of the foreign aid that Israel receives is based
on a mutual understanding over common interests, which enhances the
durability and long life of that aid.
Palestinians, as the weaker party, are more dependent on foreign aid.
Their assistance comes in part from Arab oil-producing countries,
Saudi Arabia in particular, but also from the European Union and the
United States. It comes at times in the form of government support for
the Palestinian Authority, and at other times is extended through
international development agencies to the Palestinian Authority or to
Palestinian civil society organizations.
An analysis of the foreign aid that comes to Palestinians is more
complicated because it is more varied. This aid is not based on
perceived mutual interests, but rather on humanitarian grounds or as
an attempt to influence the politics of the Palestinian people,
whether internally (by trying to direct the public debate in a certain
direction) or by bluntly trying to bend the political positions taken
by the Palestinian people and their leadership. This stands true for
foreign aid coming from Arab and non-Arab donors alike.
This characteristic, as well as Palestinian aid's diverse disbursement
makes it less sustainable, more occasional and consequently less
valuable and less influential. One can think of two periods that
clearly illustrate the role of foreign aid in the conflict. When the
Palestinian resistance was at its height in the 1970s and early 80s,
Arab oil-producing countries wished to neutralize the growing
political weight of Palestinians in pan-Arab politics, for example,
and manipulated their monetary support accordingly. Later, from 1996
to 2000, the international donor community dangled foreign aid as a
carrot and stick before the Palestinian Authority to influence its
negotiating positions.
After the signing of the Oslo accords, attempts to tie foreign aid to
improving the relations between Palestinians and Israelis (dubbed
"people-to-people" programs) proved to be artificial. Foreign aid to
Palestinians has played a crucial role in humanitarian support and
development. However, the best outcomes for this aid have been
restricted by the ongoing political conflict and the constraints
placed on the Palestinian economy by the Israeli occupation and
reoccupation. The naive aims of politically motivated support also
devalued the foreign aid effort as a whole.
If the international community were to withdraw its aid tomorrow, the
world would look to Israel- -still technically the occupying power--to
provide sustenance for Palestinians. Israel would still be obliged to
export foodstuffs to Palestine and provide for the Palestinian
electricity, water, fuel and communications infrastructures, but
neither the aid-givers nor the Palestinian Authority would be able to
pay for them. As a result, Israel would be out of pocket by as much as
$2 billion annually--unless it chose to allow Palestinians to starve
while the world watched.
This would not stop the fighting. Without the international aid, the
Palestinian economic situation would get worse, not better.
Palestinians would not stop attacking Israelis, and Israel would not
stop retaliating for the violence. If anything, the occupation--and
the opposition it provokes- -would become more intense. Once again the
many Israeli security people and politicians who today consider the
international aid community to be a hypercritical source of trouble
for Israel, would quickly change their minds.
Now Israel's disengagement plans provide the aid community with a new
and unique opportunity. If Israel does indeed abandon settlements in
the Gaza Strip and perhaps in the West Bank, the aid givers have a
unique opportunity to petition Israel to turn the homes, farms and
infrastructure that it abandons over to them, e.g., to the United
Nations and/or the World Bank. In cooperation with the Palestinian
Authority, these international institutions can then redistribute
these assets to Palestinians in an equitable manner. They can also
ensure that Israel receives a "credit" of major proportions, looking
to the day when, under a peace agreement, the value of these assets
will be deducted from Israeli compensation payments to Palestinian
1948 refugees.
The international aid community should begin by appealing, now,
publicly, to the government of Israel, to ensure that those assets are
not destroyed or removed if and when the settlers leave--to guarantee
that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon does not yield to the same impulse
that led him to destroy the settlements in Sinai when Israel departed
in 1982.
In the final analysis, attempts to use foreign aid as a means of
consolidating the peace process have not been successful by any
measure. The reason, of course, is not that making peace doesn’t
require foreign aid, but that without accompanying political effort,
foreign aid cannot compensate for defects and deficiencies in the
structure of the political process between Palestinians and Israelis.
Solomonkebede@yahoo.com
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Tuesday
March 30' 2004
