Tuesday January18, 2004

Solomon Kebede
solomonkebede@yahoo.com
 

An opportunity, not a miracle, is appearing on the horizon.

Yasser Arafat’s disappearance from the political scene in the Middle East is at one and the same time the end of an era and the beginning of another. A fresh beginning usually brings opportunities. The rise of a new Palestinian leadership should be conducive to the resumption of the peace process.

The respect enjoyed by President elect Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) should help bridge the gap between the Palestinians and the interested parties, particularly the US and Israel. Abbas’ views and personal qualities make him a reliable partner in a serious peace process. Being a partner, nonetheless, is not only a matter of personal qualities. It is also a matter of political resources, which Abu Mazen has yet to acquire.

To begin with, expectations should be kept low; guarded optimism could help avoid setbacks. An opportunity, not a miracle, is appearing on the horizon. The situation in the Middle East does not allow for miracles, even with Chairman Arafat no longer on the scene. The legacy of the past decade is too deep to be overcome by the mere rise of a new leadership in Palestine.

On the Palestinian side, Arafat’s death provides a precious opportunity to streamline and institutionalize Palestinian politics. But his absence also deprives the Palestinian polity of a safety valve that for years proved instrumental in regulating intra-Palestinian conflicts. The ceiling for rivalry among Palestinian factions, which Arafat used to provide, is no longer there, or at least has become higher than it used to be.

Intra-Palestinian strife is likely to intensify, with the competing factions struggling to improve their positions in the Palestinian political arena. This applies to the factions both within and outside Fateh. Under Arafat, the rivalry among Palestinian factions was essentially to win a bigger piece of Arafat. After Arafat, power is the big prize that everybody is seeking.

Mahmoud Abbas enjoys a great deal of respect for his personal integrity, vision and political experience. However, neither Abbas nor any other Palestinian leader has at his disposal anything approaching the influence Arafat used to enjoy. Moreover, Abu Mazen’s well-known views and plans to resolve the conflict with Israel are strongly rejected by the militant Palestinian factions. Also, the four-year intifada has both radicalized and fragmented the Palestinian political community and made it less amenable to manipulation by the Palestinian Authority.

Abbas’ leadership can only be established upon a compromise with the different Palestinian factions. The terms of the compromise are likely to keep changing according to developments on the ground. Many of the demands of the militant Palestinian opposition can hardly be met. It is unlikely, therefore, that the opposition will offer its unqualified support to the new Palestinian leader.

It is very possible, however, that the opposition will offer Abu Mazen a sort of tacit support in exchange for him not pursuing to its conclusion the policy of ending the chaotic multiplicity of armed forces in the occupied territories, and for avoiding further escalation between the PA and the militants. A fragile ceasefire, similar to the two-month ceasefire of 2003, is likely to be reached. Such a ceasefire, however, could be even more fragile than last year’s.

The structure of the Palestinian political community does not allow for such a compromise to be embodied in formal contractual arrangements. Rather, it will take the form of tacit understandings with considerable ambiguity, which will be frequently open for renegotiation, both peacefully and violently. This nascent tacit compromise in Palestine will be instrumental in avoiding a violent full-fledged intra-Palestinian conflict.

It is reasonable, therefore, to anticipate a shaky stability in the Palestinian occupied territories, at least in the near future. The new Palestinian leadership does not have much at its disposal to consolidate its power and to enhance stability. But regional and international actors can help make up for that deficit. Israel is the most important sole actor in that regard.

Israel has to reduce its conditions for resuming serious peace talks. Demanding the immediate disarmament of Palestinian armed organizations is far beyond the current capacity of the new Palestinian leadership. Asking the new Palestinian leadership to do so is an assured prescription for failure. The integrity and trustworthiness of Abbas should be sufficient to encourage the Israeli government to drop some of its conditions. Gestures of goodwill could be invaluable in this context. Releasing Palestinian prisoners, removing checkpoints, and allowing Palestinian labor into Israel would definitely be helpful. The ultimate test for Israel’s intentions is making the necessary moves to make things easier for president Abbas. The United States has to do everything possible to bring about a cooperative Israeli policy.

Arab countries can do a lot to help the new Palestinian leadership. No matter how angry the Palestinians are at the Arabs, explicit Arab support for Abu Mazen should help him in the struggle for legitimacy and power. The Algiers Arab Summit of next year should speak strongly in favor of the new Palestinian leadership. More efficient use of the stick and carrot by Arabs in dealing with militant Palestinian groupings would certainly be useful.

More important, Arab countries, particularly those that have diplomatic relations with Israel, should exert more effort to win its cooperation. The current maze of Israeli politics constrains the Sharon government’s capacity to cooperate. Positive signals coming from the Arab world could be of considerable value here.

According to Gamal A.G. Soltan the change of the Palestinian leadership is an historic opportunity. But this opportunity could be missed just as many others have been missed in the past. An historic opportunity is only so if it is captured. Whether or not the parties seize the moment is yet to be seen.