The “Soft War”: Educating minds and
nurturing bodies of putative enemies 

(Continued from last week)

‘...Improving standards of hygiene and
medical care would improve relations
between the US and the residents of
beneficiary countries…’

What is clear from a review of the new program is that the military engagement or "the hard power" is clearly there. What is equally clear is that "the soft power" or the need to address the question of education and health care is not well funded.
As Ricardo Rene Laremont is professor of political science and sociology at the State University of New York clearly stated, in this new security arrangement, Algeria is the biggest "winner". Besides the military training received, Algeria has been able to purchase $276 million in armaments from the US government during 2005 alone. In addition, Algeria has purchased $6.1 million dollars in armaments from private markets. The second largest beneficiary from these changes in policy has been Morocco.
In 2005 it was able to purchase $18 million in armaments from the US government and $3.9 million in private markets. US government arms purchases by the other beneficiary countries in these programs have been paltry. The emergence of Algeria as a key player in these new security arrangements may speak volumes about future American-Algerian cooperation. If we were simply to "follow the money", we would have to assume that Algeria and the United States may have a newly meaningful and enhanced military, intelligence and diplomatic relationship.
Regarding the "soft" aspect of this analysis, this is the area where much greater attention and funding are warranted. Ultimately, it will be new educational systems and enhanced health care delivery systems that will convert the enemies of America into friends. It would seem that a modest investment in educational and health care initiatives would reap substantial benefits. Upon a review of USAID programs for the countries discussed here, however, it seems that "soft investment" is missing.
For example, in Mali, USAID program expenditure for fiscal year 2007 is budgeted to amount to just under $32 million to be spread on health care, basic education, governance, and economic growth and communications projects. During the same period and on the same programs, USAID has budgeted less than $19 million for Nigeria. There is nothing for Chad, Mauritania or Niger.
In other words, with the exception of Mali, sufficient funds have not been made available for basic education and health care in at least four critical countries. This is due to either poor planning or poor execution of policy, especially given what we already know about the ameliorative effect that these kinds of initiatives have on positive public perceptions of the US. Why the military aspect of this anti-terrorist initiative in the Sahel has been funded while the non-military programs have been neglected is difficult to comprehend.
Beyond the lack of balance in the appropriations for "hard" and "soft" initiatives, the other aspect that seems to be at least somewhat misguided is that the most of the military training has taken place in the Sahara desert. The expenditure of $500 million over a five-year period may be entirely appropriate if the center of gravity for the Islamist movement were located in the desert.
Quite evidently, that is not the case. Militant Islamism is an urban phenomenon. In urban areas, educational systems are often under-funded and directed by Islamists. Improving standards of hygiene and medical care would improve relations between the US and the residents of beneficiary countries. In Niger, for example, Cuba has sent hundreds of doctors who improve health care there by reforming hygienic methods and providing rudimentary medicines. How can Cuba afford to send hundreds of doctors to Niger and the United States not? Can US afford not to?
Beyond the provision of educational and medical support in urban areas, the last missing element in this effort to detect and monitor militant Islamism involves the need to collect basic intelligence or information regarding the socioeconomic causes for militant Islamism.
It seems that the United States has a limited presence on the ground in urban environments where Islamists live and recruit. It would seem that an almost immediate investment in human intelligence gathering capabilities is needed in places like Kano, Abidjan, Monrovia, Freetown, Dakar and Lagos.
Finally, in my view, the traditional forms of Islam that have been practiced in Africa over centuries (especially variants of Sufi Islam) have never posed a security risk to the interests of the United States. It is only one smaller, more violent variant of militant Islam that needs regular surveillance and counter-measures.
This violent form of Islam finds political expression because real and legitimate frustrations exist in many Muslim communities regarding failed educational systems, sub-standard health care delivery systems, high rates of infant mortality, and endemic poverty.
It seems that while continuing investment in military programs, to avoid the "soft power" alternatives that are both available and inexpensive would seem to work only to the detriment of collective security.