Historical Notes on Books 1

By Professor Richard Pankhurst

Ato Behanu Tessema, Sir Robert Napier, and the Maqdala Expedition
My old friend Senator Berhanu Tessema, sometime Ethiopian Consul in Kenya, Ambassador in Liberia and Turkey, etc., was in his day a great book collector.
One of the books he obtained was Clements Markham’s well-known account of the British expedition to Maqdala, of 1867-8, entitled The History of the Abyssinian Expedition, which appeared in 1869.
Ato Berhanu’s copy of this work is unique – and interesting - in that it belonged to none other than the expedition’s Commander-in-Chief, Sir Robert Napier – who chose to annotate it with his own comments. This is an evil habit, particularly in libraries, and not to be recommended to our readers. However in the present case what Napier did is interesting – for his annotations give us an intimate view of the Maqdala campaign so to speak from the horse’s mouth. They show that the expedition was far from the perfect operation sometimes suggested, and that though Markham’s book is generally taken as authoritative, the Commander-in-Chief disagreed with its author on several not insignificant points.
The Annotations: Napier versus Merewether
Napier’s annotations reveal in the first place that there were major disagreements between himself, as Commander-in-Chief, and Colonel Merewether, the British Political Resident in Aden, who was responsible for planning the initial phase of the Maqdala operation. This disagreement becomes apparent already on page 134 of the book where Markham states that Merewether had originally proposed that the expedition should consist of only one British and six Indian battalions. Napier angrily dismisses the idea, declaring that “no one in the Expedition would concur” with the view that so small a force “would have done the work” required of it.
The British Commander-in-Chief was particularly critical of Merewether’s role in organizing the expedition’s landing at the coast, and of the initial march inland. Commenting on page 138 of the book, which describes that phase of operations, he declares that “notwithstanding earlier information… fifteen days were wasted… in a useless attempt” to proceed along the Ragolay torrent bed. The result was that the invading force was obliged to return to the coast “exhausted”.
Reverting to Merewether’s role, as discussed by Markham who states on page 140 that the Colonel was responsible for choosing the expedition’s landing site, Napier comments that this responsibility was in fact transferred to a Committee. This, he notes, was because the Government did not have full confidence in the Colonel, who favoured a landing point somewhat to the east of that decided upon. The Colonel, he adds, did thus, as noted above, in fact “waste 15 days”.
Elaborating on this point, which was clearly a sore one with him, Napier rejects Markham’s statement, on pages 140-1, that Merewether had selected Monkullu as the landing point. He reiterates that the decision was made “by the committee, and not by Col. Merewether”.
Increasingly incensed by Markham’s account of Merewether’s activities, on pages 145-6, Napier declares that they were:
“All waste of time incurred in opposition to clear warnings and to the remonstrances of Cols. Phayre and Wilkins”.
What was even worse, to Napier’s mind, was that the two above officers had been led to believe that Merewether was acting on his (Napier’s) orders. He had thus said, “I am ordered”, but the Commander-in-Chief comments: “he was certainly ordered to the contrary by me”.
Napier, by this stage of his reading of the book, felt that Markham was consistently exaggerating Merewether’s role, and ignoring that of the Commander-in-Chief. When Markham writes, on page 153, that Merewether had come to an agreement to purchase supplies from the local Saho people, Marham insists that the Colonel was merely acting “under instructions” from himself. When the author states, on pages 165-6, that Merewether circulated a proclamation to the Ethiopian people, Napier exclaims that this text was in fact disseminated “under orders from the Commander-in-Chief”. When Markham says, on pages 222-3, that Merewether had “contrived to keep open a wonderfully regular system of communication” between the British captives at Maqdala and the coast, Napier comments that it was actually the captives themselves who kept it open.
And so it goes on!
When Markham praises the work carried out by Merewether prior to Napier’s arrival, the Commander-in-Chief roundly comments:
“No doubt much had been done – but much had been neglected. Colonel Merewether, contrary to instruction, dispossessed Col. Field of the command in virtue of his seniority, though only in a civil capacity. Col. Field therefore took no measures for maintaining order at Zoula, but confined himself to making himself useful with his troops at Koomeyley. Col. Merewether kept to the highland and reconnoitering long after the necessity ceased, took no measures for establishing order on the coast, and the greatest confusion reigned until Sir C. Staveley arrived”.
Towards Maqdala
Napier’s annotations also deal with the British advance inland.
Commenting on Markham’s account, on pages 259-60, of the supplies of grain obtained by the British troops on the march, Napier observes that “up to the date” of his interview with Dejazmach Kassa, the then ruler of Tegray, “nothing of consequence had been purchased”, but that “from that date the influx commenced”.
Napier subsequently comments on Markham’s account, around page 318, of the last phase of the expedition. The author stated that Colonel Phayre wrote a message to the Commander-in-Chief, for which he had been criticized in the British press. In it he stated that he had “obtained an extensive view of the country up to the foot of ascent of Fala, and ascertained that the Workwaha valley was unoccupied by the enemy”.
Napier was not satisfied with this. He comments: “The letter of Col. Phayre said ‘I will go with the sappers and secure the Aroge pass – he did not do so –and it was left open to the enemy”.
Evidently bad generalship!
Napier and the Famous Gift of Tewodros’s Cattle
Napier’s final annotation was on the vexed – and much debated - question of Tewodros’s gift of cattle to the British immediately prior to his suicide. Discussing this famous present Markham noted, on page 318, that Tewodros had sent Napier this gift, hoping, “in accordance with Eastern custom”, that it would lead to peace. The author here added a footnote to the effect that the British commander-in-Chief had drafted – but not dispatched - a letter to the Ethiopian monarch, stating that his gift was “only provisionally accepted, on condition that he should give himself up, as well as all the Europeans” [i.e. the European prisoners].
Apparently denying the existence of any such letter, Napier ironically comments: “No one could tell the contents of the letter but Mr. Markham”.
Clearly we have to be more careful than in the past in reading the good Mr Markham!

Ato Behanu Tessema, Sir Robert Napier, and the Maqdala Expedition
My old friend Senator Berhanu Tessema, sometime Ethiopian Consul in Kenya, Ambassador in Liberia and Turkey, etc., was in his day a great book collector.
One of the books he obtained was Clements Markham’s well-known account of the British expedition to Maqdala, of 1867-8, entitled The History of the Abyssinian Expedition, which appeared in 1869.
Ato Berhanu’s copy of this work is unique – and interesting - in that it belonged to none other than the expedition’s Commander-in-Chief, Sir Robert Napier – who chose to annotate it with his own comments. This is an evil habit, particularly in libraries, and not to be recommended to our readers. However in the present case what Napier did is interesting – for his annotations give us an intimate view of the Maqdala campaign so to speak from the horse’s mouth. They show that the expedition was far from the perfect operation sometimes suggested, and that though Markham’s book is generally taken as authoritative, the Commander-in-Chief disagreed with its author on several not insignificant points.
The Annotations: Napier versus Merewether
Napier’s annotations reveal in the first place that there were major disagreements between himself, as Commander-in-Chief, and Colonel Merewether, the British Political Resident in Aden, who was responsible for planning the initial phase of the Maqdala operation. This disagreement becomes apparent already on page 134 of the book where Markham states that Merewether had originally proposed that the expedition should consist of only one British and six Indian battalions. Napier angrily dismisses the idea, declaring that “no one in the Expedition would concur” with the view that so small a force “would have done the work” required of it.
The British Commander-in-Chief was particularly critical of Merewether’s role in organizing the expedition’s landing at the coast, and of the initial march inland. Commenting on page 138 of the book, which describes that phase of operations, he declares that “notwithstanding earlier information… fifteen days were wasted… in a useless attempt” to proceed along the Ragolay torrent bed. The result was that the invading force was obliged to return to the coast “exhausted”.
Reverting to Merewether’s role, as discussed by Markham who states on page 140 that the Colonel was responsible for choosing the expedition’s landing site, Napier comments that this responsibility was in fact transferred to a Committee. This, he notes, was because the Government did not have full confidence in the Colonel, who favoured a landing point somewhat to the east of that decided upon. The Colonel, he adds, did thus, as noted above, in fact “waste 15 days”.
Elaborating on this point, which was clearly a sore one with him, Napier rejects Markham’s statement, on pages 140-1, that Merewether had selected Monkullu as the landing point. He reiterates that the decision was made “by the committee, and not by Col. Merewether”.
Increasingly incensed by Markham’s account of Merewether’s activities, on pages 145-6, Napier declares that they were:
“All waste of time incurred in opposition to clear warnings and to the remonstrances of Cols. Phayre and Wilkins”.
What was even worse, to Napier’s mind, was that the two above officers had been led to believe that Merewether was acting on his (Napier’s) orders. He had thus said, “I am ordered”, but the Commander-in-Chief comments: “he was certainly ordered to the contrary by me”.
Napier, by this stage of his reading of the book, felt that Markham was consistently exaggerating Merewether’s role, and ignoring that of the Commander-in-Chief. When Markham writes, on page 153, that Merewether had come to an agreement to purchase supplies from the local Saho people, Marham insists that the Colonel was merely acting “under instructions” from himself. When the author states, on pages 165-6, that Merewether circulated a proclamation to the Ethiopian people, Napier exclaims that this text was in fact disseminated “under orders from the Commander-in-Chief”. When Markham says, on pages 222-3, that Merewether had “contrived to keep open a wonderfully regular system of communication” between the British captives at Maqdala and the coast, Napier comments that it was actually the captives themselves who kept it open.
And so it goes on!
When Markham praises the work carried out by Merewether prior to Napier’s arrival, the Commander-in-Chief roundly comments:
“No doubt much had been done – but much had been neglected. Colonel Merewether, contrary to instruction, dispossessed Col. Field of the command in virtue of his seniority, though only in a civil capacity. Col. Field therefore took no measures for maintaining order at Zoula, but confined himself to making himself useful with his troops at Koomeyley. Col. Merewether kept to the highland and reconnoitering long after the necessity ceased, took no measures for establishing order on the coast, and the greatest confusion reigned until Sir C. Staveley arrived”.
Towards Maqdala
Napier’s annotations also deal with the British advance inland.
Commenting on Markham’s account, on pages 259-60, of the supplies of grain obtained by the British troops on the march, Napier observes that “up to the date” of his interview with Dejazmach Kassa, the then ruler of Tegray, “nothing of consequence had been purchased”, but that “from that date the influx commenced”.
Napier subsequently comments on Markham’s account, around page 318, of the last phase of the expedition. The author stated that Colonel Phayre wrote a message to the Commander-in-Chief, for which he had been criticized in the British press. In it he stated that he had “obtained an extensive view of the country up to the foot of ascent of Fala, and ascertained that the Workwaha valley was unoccupied by the enemy”.
Napier was not satisfied with this. He comments: “The letter of Col. Phayre said ‘I will go with the sappers and secure the Aroge pass – he did not do so –and it was left open to the enemy”.
Evidently bad generalship!
Napier and the Famous Gift of Tewodros’s Cattle
Napier’s final annotation was on the vexed – and much debated - question of Tewodros’s gift of cattle to the British immediately prior to his suicide. Discussing this famous present Markham noted, on page 318, that Tewodros had sent Napier this gift, hoping, “in accordance with Eastern custom”, that it would lead to peace. The author here added a footnote to the effect that the British commander-in-Chief had drafted – but not dispatched - a letter to the Ethiopian monarch, stating that his gift was “only provisionally accepted, on condition that he should give himself up, as well as all the Europeans” [i.e. the European prisoners].
Apparently denying the existence of any such letter, Napier ironically comments: “No one could tell the contents of the letter but Mr. Markham”.
Clearly we have to be more careful than in the past in reading the good Mr Markham!