The issue of buliding developmental state

In the 1980s, the orthodoxy admonished ‘the rolling back’ of the state and giving free reins to supposedly ‘free market forces and civil society’. The state was to be cut off almost completely from the economy and all its facets were to be ‘streamlined and disciplined’ to make it functional. However, although there was a substantial restructuring of state institutions, this did not necessarily translate into appreciable growth. Indeed, some of the adverse consequences of that ‘restructuring’ included diminished access to key social services such as education, and health which are central to human development.
The orthodoxy on ‘rolling back the state’ came under challenge as the 1990s progressed, leading to a major revision of the state’s role by none other than the World Bank itself, which candidly acknowledged: As so often happens with such radical shifts in perspectives, countries sometimes tended to overshoot the mark. Efforts to rebalance government spending and borrowing were un-coordinated, and good was often cut as the bad.
To meet their interest rate obligations, countries in debt squeezed critically, important programmes in education, health and infrastructure as –or more than- they cut low-priority programmes, bloated civil service and money-losing enterprises. Reductions came primarily in capital budgets and, in Africa, in operating and maintenance outlay further reducing the efficiency of investment. The result, seen most starkly in Africa, was neglect of the state’s vital functions, threatening social welfare and eroding the function of market development.
This view is largely influenced by the success of the state’s role in the ‘miracle’ economies of East Asia where the rules and institutions allow markets to flourish, while people’s lives substantially improve. There has therefore been a paradigm shift regarding the state’s role in sustainable development; it is now being recognised that development without an effective state is almost impossible.
A major problem facing the consolidation of democracy in Africa is the translation of the state apparatus from one that served an ‘oppressive state’ to that of developmental project. This is not a question of ‘dismantling the neo-colonial state’ as suggested by some analyses, but involves the construction of efficient state institutions that will have the capacity to implement developmental goals and forge a cordial relationship with the private sector in the process of economic growth. In essence, what Africa needs has been aptly described as a ‘developmental state’. A developmental state is that which is essentially democratic in orientation and sets as its primacy the task of development. Such a state will facilitate rapid process of capital accumulation and industrialisation, while not compromising the goal of social welfare for the people.
Although the African state like its counterpart in the rest of the world is preoccupied with contemporary issues such as security, health care delivery and HIV/AIDS, it is at the same time focused on a more demanding task of economic development, state building, nation building and democratization.
The burden imposed by these problems as well as the prevailing internal socio-economic and political decay as recently demonstrated in Darfur in Sudan, the Niger delta in Nigeria and cases in Sierra Leone and Liberia, to mention just a few, preempts any afro-optimism regarding the state of affairs and the prospect for immediate socio-economic and political development on the continent. However, there has also been a shift in scholarly debates on the study of problems facing the continent. The focus is more and more on internal deficiencies within the African state such as the failure of leadership and the question of good governance; this is contrary to earlier studies attributing the undeniable African problems to both colonial and neo-colonial legacies.
The question of state building revolves around the effectiveness of the state and its ability to discharge its responsibility to its citizenry. And, democratization concerns the process of institutional governance which facilitates the effective allocation of resources within a particular geopolitical entity and socio-economic development. All these take place within an environment characterized by globalization which focuses on the ability of the African states to engage in and the extent to which it influences or be influenced, within the global infrastructure. In its totality, the impact of the global system and the direct participation of Africa in global transformation remain important factors in determining the capability of the African state in a world in which its underdevelopment is a by-product of its incorporation into the metropolitan economy in the first place.
The current wave of democratization faces a tremendous challenge because of the direct connection between the process and the degree of legitimate authority within the state. In order for the state to successfully develop the right condition within which to sustain democracy, it must be perceived by the population as the protector of their interests and in order for the state to sustain the process it must also establish a level of trust between itself and the people. This dilemma is compounded by global transformation which imposes additional stress on the legitimate authority of the state. The effective participation in the global environment promotes sustainable growth, which is impossible to attain because of the nature of the African states.
The level of confusion is enormous and undermines the successful assertion of the state structure because of the lack of trust, and disconnection inherited from the colonial experience. For example, the extended family system remains a critical support for the individual within an African societal setting but in the context of modern Africa, it is inherently injurious to the survival of the individual, and the need to eliminate this support system, creates problems in the attempt to build a vibrant and united community. Another example can be found in the redundant role of the traditional institutions and values in modern Africa. For hundreds of years, these institutions and values provided legitimacy for the state and the spiritual identity for the relation between the governed and the governor; but today, they have remained irrelevant and in time of crisis are unable to sustain the people in their search for answers to the challenges of the modern state within which they exist.
Therefore, building democratic institutions helps to ensure that the priorities of diverse social groups and institutions are considered in the formulation of development strategies. Democratization in this case also means building a democratic state, and doing so means institutional change (the form of the state), representative change who has influence over policies and to whom is the state responsible and functional transformation what the state does or the range of state responsibilities.
It is obvious that no state is fully democratic but the process of democratization requires a transformation of the visible structures of the state, and this same process can be hindered by the difficulties of institutional reforms, the prevalence of non-democratic cultures, and elite opposition. The abuse of power by transition elites and corruption within the society can limit democratization. Democratic deficits can also be caused by ethnic differences or nationality problems, diminished sovereignty, poor state capacity, and authoritarian legacies. Many African states which have also made the transition from military dictatorship to democracy suffer from the residues of the military culture in terms of policy initiatives, practices and decision making process.
The regulatory capacity of a developmental state, including the capacity to discipline the market to the requirements of long-term development will need to be sharpened. Of particular relevance here is the capacity not only to generate and manage growth but also to distribute its benefits in a manner that is consistent with the goals of nation-building, a stable foundation for continued accumulation and the aspirations of the populace for improved social livelihood standards.
Such capacity will similarly need to be extended to the management of periods of economic crisis and decline. Attention will also need to be paid more closely to the revitalisation of education both at the primary and tertiary levels in order to raise the levels of literacy and renew the corps of technically competent personnel required for managing the state and the economy.
Finally, a new dynamism will have to be infused into the interventions of the state in the economy, with officials taking more seriously the questions of if, when, where, how, for how long and at what level they should intervene in the markets and the reciprocal rules that should govern relations between government and business. This latter point is an extremely important one which is broadly relevant for all states but given the differences in the levels of development and needs of African countries, it would be fool-hardy to attempt to devise and impose a one-size-fits-all model of state intervention in the economy.